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Abstract
Human decisions are based on accumulating evidence over time for different options. Here we ask a simple question: How
is the accumulation of evidence affected by the level of awareness of the information? We examined the influence of
awareness on decision-making using combined behavioral methods and magneto-encephalography (MEG). Participants
were required to make decisions by accumulating evidence over a series of visually presented arrow stimuli whose visibility
was modulated by masking. Behavioral results showed that participants could accumulate evidence under both high and
low visibility. However, a top-down strategic modulation of the flow of incoming evidence was only present for stimuli with
high visibility: once enough evidence had been accrued, participants strategically reduced the impact of new incoming
stimuli. Also, decision-making speed and confidence were strongly modulated by the strength of the evidence for high-
visible but not low-visible evidence, even though direct priming effects were identical for both types of stimuli. Neural
recordings revealed that, while initial perceptual processing was independent of visibility, there was stronger top-down
amplification for stimuli with high visibility than low visibility. Furthermore, neural markers of evidence accumulation over
occipito-parietal cortex showed a strategic bias only for highly visible sensory information, speeding up processing and
reducing neural computations related to the decision process. Our results indicate that the level of awareness of
information changes decision-making: while accumulation of evidence already exists under low visibility conditions, high
visibility allows evidence to be accumulated up to a higher level, leading to important strategical top-down changes in
decision-making. Our results therefore suggest a potential role of awareness in deploying flexible strategies for biasing
information acquisition in line with one’s expectations and goals.
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Introduction
Many decisions can be formalized as a process of accumulation
of evidence over time, ultimately favoring one alternative over
another [1,2]. Evidence accumulation models have successfully
captured the neural dynamics of simple decisions in a visual
motion categorization task [3] as well as more complex decisions
in which discrete pieces of evidence need to be integrated [4].
Here we investigate whether accumulation of evidence is affected
by the level of awareness of the information.
Visual subliminal priming studies have shown that perceptual [5–7],
cognitive [8,9], motor [10], and executive [11,12] stages can all be
influenced by subliminal information. Furthermore, the amount of
priming and subliminal processing increases linearly with prime
processing [13,14], suggesting that some stages of evidence accumu-
lation can proceed without awareness. Also, relatively long-term effects
of subliminal priming have sometimes been observed [15–18],
suggesting that accumulation of unconscious information is possible.
However, it is an open question whether and how awareness
modulates the way evidence is accumulated during decision-making.
Contemporary models of subliminal information processing
posit that subliminal information is marked by a lack of ‘‘global
ignition’’ [19], meaning that it cannot enter into a global
workspace system that allows it to be held in working memory
and broadcasted to a variety of higher level neural processors. This
lack of ignition may preclude ‘‘access’’ to the information.
Therefore, awareness may be a necessary condition for biasing
and modifying the sensory evidence in line with one’s expectations
and goals during decision-making.
In this study, we directly test the potential role of awareness in
human decision-making using a previously described task in which
participants have to accumulate sequentially presented pieces of
evidence across an extended period of time. We previously
observed a dependency of evidence accumulation on the amount
of prior accumulated evidence: when prior evidence was already
strong, participants weighted the newly incoming information
much less than when prior evidence was weak and indecisive [20].
Here we hypothesize that this top-down modulation may depend
on awareness. While accumulation may be possible irrespective of
the level of awareness [15–18], it may appear qualitatively
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 1 November 2011 | Volume 9 | Issue 11 | e1001203
different depending on awareness level. Specifically, if awareness is
necessary for top-down biasing of information during decision-
making, low-visible evidence may be accumulated in a linear
fashion, i.e. adding and subtracting new information without
regard to the history of prior accumulated evidence. Non-
linearities in evidence accumulation (e.g., giving less weight to
new information under conditions of high certainty [20,21]),
which are a more optimal decision strategy within a Bayesian
decision-making framework [22], may be present only for high-
visible evidence.
We tested this hypothesis by using a decision-making task in
which a sequence of five arrows was presented at either high or
low visibility (HV versus LV), by means of masking (Figure 1A). In
a series of behavioral experiments, we established whether and
how evidence is accumulated over time, depending on the level of
awareness. We also assessed the relationship between accumulated
evidence and subjective decision confidence for stimuli at both
awareness levels. Finally, we tracked accumulation-related neural
activity over time in the human brain for both types of
information, using magneto-encephalography (MEG).
Results
Behavioral Markers of Evidence Accumulation Over Time
On each trial, participants (N=16) were presented with a
stream of five arrows, each of which could point to the left or right
with equal probability. Participants had to quickly decide on the
overall direction of the arrows by pressing a button at the end of
each stream with their left or right index finger, guessing if
necessary (Figure 1A). Strength of the evidence could range from
one (low evidence, e.g. two left and three right arrows) to five (high
evidence, e.g. five right arrows, see evidence accumulation
diagram in Figure 1B). Visibility of the arrows was manipulated
by masking them with an effective ‘‘metacontrast’’ mask (leading
to low visibility, LV) or with an equiluminant but less effective
‘‘pseudo’’ mask (leading to high visibility, HV; see Figure S1 for
details) [14,23]. On each trial, all arrows were either LV or HV.
Stimulus and mask duration were identical for LV and HV
conditions, allowing us to compare behavioral performance of
evidence accumulation and the underlying neural responses
without confounding stimulus visibility with basic task parameters
[24]. A six-choice discrimination task performed after the main
experiment confirmed that visibility of the arrows was much
poorer on LV trials than on HV trials (31% correct versus 73%
correct, Figure 1C; difference: p,0.001, see Materials and
Methods for further details).
In the decision-making task, behavioral performance was less
accurate for LV than for HV trials (60% versus 81% correct,
p,0.001). Nevertheless, for both LV and HV trials, performance
increased with increasing amount of evidence (both p,0.001), and
thus evidence was accumulated for both trial types. For HV trials,
performance approached a ceiling level of 100% correct for the
highest evidence levels. For LV trials, the increase in performance
was linear, peaking at 73% correct on trials with five identical
arrows (Figure 1D). There was a trend of a right-side bias for LV
trials when all arrows pointed in the same direction (67% versus
79%: T= 1.78, p=0.096). Although we had no a priori hypothesis
for such a bias, the finding is in line with earlier psychophysical
studies showing that choices can be strongly biased by hand-
preference especially under conditions of uncertainty (as in the
case of the LV stimuli) [25–27].
While evidence accumulation was present for both LV and HV
stimuli, there were striking behavioral differences in terms of how
evidence was accumulated between conditions. First, the speed of
decision-making was modulated by the amount of accumulated
evidence for HV (p,0.001) but not for LV information (p=0.31),
leading to a significant interaction (p=0.025, Figure 1E). Second,
the ‘‘impact’’ of each successive arrow on the final decision varied
as a function of time and accumulated evidence only for HV trials.
We defined the impact of an arrow as the extent to which the
arrow changed the response proportion in the direction of the
arrow (see Materials and Methods for details on the exact
quantification procedure). We observed a monotonically increas-
ing impact of arrows on the decision as a function of time for HV
stimuli (p,0.001), while this modulation of time was only marginal
for LV stimuli (p=0.07), leading to a significant interaction
(p,0.001, Figure 1F). Moreover, for HV arrows, the influence of
the last arrow, defined as the extent to which it changed the
response probability in the direction of the arrow, decreased
linearly with the amount of previously accumulated evidence: the
larger the amount of accumulated evidence, the less influence the
last arrow had on the decision (p,0.001), as expected from a
rational strategy of progressively disregarding the arrows once
sufficient evidence is obtained (Figure 1B). This modulation of
accumulation by prior evidence was absent for LV stimuli
(p=0.44), leading to a significant interaction (p,0.001, Figure 1G).
Together, these results show that strategic effects on decision-
making strongly depend on the awareness level of the stimuli.
Interestingly, these results were not simply due to the possibility
that, during HV trials, participants stopped performing the task
after having observed a sufficient amount of arrows. A ‘‘logical
counting’’ algorithm would not give any weight to the last arrow
when two or four pieces of evidence had already been
accumulated, since the last arrow cannot change the decision
anymore. In our data, however, the last arrow did have a sizeable
influence on the decision even when four pieces of evidence had
already been accumulated (Figure 1G, red line, right data point).
We further explored the relationship between decision-making
performance and subjective confidence in a new group of 16
participants; this time we additionally asked them to rate their
confidence of having responded correctly after every trial on a 6-
point scale (1 = pure guess, 6 = 100% sure). Overall decision-
Author Summary
When making a decision, we gather evidence for the
different options and ultimately choose on the basis of the
accumulated evidence. A fundamental question is whether
and how conscious awareness of the evidence changes
this decision-making process. Here, we examined the
influence of sensory awareness on decision-making using
behavioral studies and magneto-encephalographic record-
ings in human participants. In our task, participants had to
indicate the prevailing direction of five arrows presented
on a screen that each pointed either left or right, and in
different trials these arrows were either easy to see (high
visibility) or difficult to see (low visibility). Behavioral and
neural recordings show that evidence accumulation
changed from a linear to a non-linear integration strategy
with increasing stimulus visibility. In particular, the impact
of later evidence was reduced when more evidence had
been accrued, but only for highly visible information. By
contrast, barely perceptible arrows contributed equally to
a decision because participants needed to continue to
accumulate evidence in order to make an accurate
decision. These results suggest that consciousness may
play a role in decision-making by biasing the accumulation
of new evidence.
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making performance was similar as in the MEG environment (in
terms of overall performance and increase in performance with
increasing evidence). As expected, overall confidence for LV
arrows was much lower than for HV arrows (1.9 versus 3.8:
p,0.001; Figure 1H). More interestingly, participants’ confidence
level for correct responses and incorrect responses was nearly
equal for LV arrows (difference = 0.05, p=0.093), but strongly
dissociated for HV arrows (difference = 1.07, p,0.001; Figure 1I),
resulting in a significant interaction (p,0.001). Thus participants
had little insight in their accuracy level when arrows were strongly
masked (LV), but they could very well distinguish correct from
error trials when arrows were only weakly masked (HV). Since the
inability to perform second-order confidence judgments has been
proposed as a marker of lack of awareness [28], the results confirm
that awareness was strongly reduced on LV compared to HV
trials. When directly correlating decision-making performance and
confidence for the correct trials, there was a strong correlation
between these measures for HV trials (r = 0.77, p,0.001), while
there was only a weak and marginally significant correlation for
LV arrows (r = 0.23, p=0.087, Figure 1J). However, this was likely
due to the restricted range of confidence during LV since most
participants reported low confidence levels for LV trials. When the
range was restricted to the lowest three confidence levels, there was
in fact a significant correlation between decision-making perfor-
mance and confidence also for LV trials (r = 0.66, p,0.001).
Overall, the results revealed that participants had markedly
reduced confidence in their decision making for LV arrows, but
could still use the information to achieve above-chance perfor-
mance on the decision task.
Finally, we tested whether there was a difference in ‘‘stimulus
strength’’ between the LV and HV arrows. In all experiments
described so far, the arrow stimuli themselves were identical
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Figure 1. Task set-up and behavioral performance. (A) Task. Participants were shown a sequence of five arrows that were briefly shown and
subsequently masked. Masks were constructed such that the arrows were either highly visible (HV) or near the threshold of awareness (low-visibility,
LV). Participants had to decide whether the predominant direction of the arrow sequence was left or right. (B) Evidence accumulation diagram.
Participants start with no evidence for either direction. Each incoming arrow moves the sum up or down in the diagram. Solid lines show the
transitions for the HV example in panel A. States at which no decision can yet be made are highlighted in light-grey; states at which enough evidence
is available for the decision are highlighted in dark-grey. (C) Individual performance during the six-choice discrimination task (Experiment 2) for HV
and LV stimuli. (D) Decision-making performance as a function of accumulated evidence for HV and LV stimuli. Negative and positive numbers denote
evidence for a left and right response, respectively (number of right-arrows minus number of left-arrows). (E) Reaction times as a function of
accumulated evidence for HV and LV stimuli. (F) Impact of each arrow on the final decision (i.e., the extent to which the direction of the arrow
determined the decision) over time for HV and LV trials. (G) Influence of the last arrow on the final decision as a function of the amount of previously
accumulated evidence for HV and LV stimuli. (H) Confidence ratings of visibility for HV and LV arrows (Experiment 3). (I) Confidence ratings for correct
and error trials for HV and LV arrows (Experiment 3). (J) Relationship between confidence level and performance for HV and LV stimuli (Experiment 3).
(K) Priming strength of single HV or LV arrow as measured in a distinct masked priming task, in terms of error rate (left panel) and reaction times (right
panel, Experiment 4).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001203.g001
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between conditions, and the only difference was the efficacy of the
mask. Therefore, theoretically, the bottom-up stimulus strength,
i.e. the ability of the stimulus to automatically climb up the
sensorimotor pathways, may be equal for both conditions, even
though visibility was strongly dissociated. To test this notion
directly, we assessed and directly compared the priming strength
of the LV and HV stimuli. Sixteen participants performed a simple
masked priming experiment in which they responded as fast as
possible to the direction of the mask (whose external outline was
changed to a left- or right-pointing arrow; see Figure S1 and [14]).
The mask was preceded by a LV or HV prime arrow pointing into
the same or the opposite direction as the target. Congruence of the
arrow prime resulted in significantly shorter reaction times (RT)
and lower error rates (ER) to the mask for both LV and HV
primes (all p,0.001). Crucially, this priming effect was not
significantly different between LV and HV primes (RT priming
effect: LV=55 ms, HV=50 ms, p=0.13; ER priming effect:
LV=18%, HV=17%, p=0.39; Figure 1K), in line with earlier
findings [29]. This shows that the bottom-up stimulus strength is
equal for LV and HV arrows, and points to an interesting
dissociation between the ‘‘direct’’ priming impact of a stimulus and
its visibility and its long-term effect on decision-making.
Neural Markers of Visibility
Using MEG, we first investigated whether LV and HV arrows
were processed differently in the human brain, irrespective of
evidence or direction. We used a cluster-level statistic to establish
the significance of differences between conditions. This method
effectively controls the type I error rate in situations involving
multiple comparisons (such as 275 sensors) by clustering
neighboring sensor pairs that exhibit the same effect (see Materials
and Methods for more details). A direct comparison of LV and
HV arrows, collapsed across all five arrows, revealed that there
was larger activity for HV than LV arrows over left frontal and
fronto-central sensors (50–100 ms interval, pcluster = 0.018 and
pcluster = 0.016, respectively). At a later interval, there was larger
activity for HV than LV arrows over parietal (100–150 ms
interval, pcluster = 0.001) and occipital (150–300 ms interval,
pcluster,0.001; Figure 2) sensors. A detailed time course analysis
estimated the first point of significant difference at 55 ms for the
frontal cluster, 125 ms for the parietal cluster, and 145 ms for the
occipital cluster (Figure 2B). The early frontal difference between
HV and LV arrows was present for all arrows except for the first
arrow of the sequence (Figure S2A), while the occipital and
parietal amplification for HV arrows was visible for each and every
arrow (Figure S2B,C). Interestingly, there was a behavioral
counterpart of the frontal asymmetry between the first and
subsequent arrows: whereas the first arrow had equal effects on the
decision for LV and HV arrows, there were large differences in the
weight of the subsequent arrows on the decision (Figure 1F).
Neural Markers of Evidence Accumulation Over Time
Previously we identified an inverse relationship between parietal
and central neural activity and the amount of accumulated
evidence: when more evidence was accumulated, neural activity
evoked by new incoming stimuli was attenuated [20] (see [30,31]
for comparable results). This pattern is consistent with the strategy
to reduce the weight of new evidence once substantial evidence has
already been accumulated. Behavioral results indeed showed that
the impact of the last arrow decreased with the total amount of
previously accumulated evidence, but for HV arrows only
(Figure 1G).
For the analysis of evidence accumulation in the MEG
environment, we compared activity for LV and HV arrows that
had ‘‘low prior accumulated evidence’’ and ‘‘high prior accumu-
lated evidence,’’ averaged across the third to fifth arrow
presentation (the first two arrow presentations are not taken into
account since there is no differential amount of prior accumulated
evidence until after the first two arrows have been presented). Low
evidence consisted of trials with zero (for third and fifth arrow) or
one (for fourth arrow) prior accumulated evidence at the onset of
the arrow. High evidence consisted of trials with two (for third and
fifth arrow), three (for fourth arrow), or four (for fifth arrow) prior
accumulated evidence at arrow onset.
We found that when participants had high prior accumulated
evidence, the newly incoming arrows evoked a smaller activity at
right occipito-parietal and central sensors. Crucially, this phe-
nomenon was significant only for HV arrows (central sensors:
150–200 ms interval, pcluster = 0.014; occipito-parietal sensors:
250–300 ms interval, pcluster = 0.041) (Figure 3A, top row), while
there was only a non-significant trend for LV arrows in central
sensors (150–200 ms interval, pcluster = 0.077) (Figure 3A, middle
row). This resulted in a significant difference between conditions
over right occipito-parietal sensors (HV versus LV: 250–300 ms
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Figure 2. Neural markers of visibility. (A) Topographical represen-
tation of overall activity engendered by HV (top row) and LV (middle
row) arrows, as well as differences in activity between them (bottom
row). Activity (differences) is shown at five intervals after the onset
of the arrow, from 50–300 ms. Dots indicate significant clusters of
larger activity for HV than LV stimuli (p,0.05, corrected for multiple
comparisons). (B) Time course of fronto-central (left panel), parietal
(middle panel), and occipital (right panel) clusters for HV and LV arrows.
Time course of frontal activity was plotted for all sensors with significant
differences in the 50–100 ms interval, the parietal activity time course
for the significant parietal sensors in the 100–150 ms interval, and
occipital activity for the significant occipital sensors in the 150–200 ms
interval. The dotted lines and numbers indicate the latency (in ms) at
which differences between conditions first became significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001203.g002
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interval, pcluster = 0.042) (Figure 3A, bottom row). Whereas neural
responses are collapsed across arrows in this figure, Figure S2B
shows that this effect was robustly observed in response to
individual arrow presentations preceded by low and high evidence
(a difference defined only for the third to fifth arrow, since
differences in amount of accumulated evidence only arise after two
arrows have been presented).
Neural Activity Related to a Change of Evidence
Under conditions of purely linear addition and subtraction of
information, the direction of the previous arrow should not
influence how the current arrow is processed. However, previous
studies have described an automatic influence of repetition
compared to alternation during decision-making [32], and
previously we also showed a large reduction in neural activity
for repeated compared to non-repeated arrows under conditions of
high visibility [20]. When directly contrasting ‘‘repeat’’ arrows (i.e.
arrows that were preceded by an arrow with the same direction)
with ‘‘change’’ arrows (i.e. arrows that were preceded by an arrow
with the opposite direction), we observed a large neural activity
reduction for arrow repetitions (neural responses are collapsed
across arrows). For HV arrows, this reduction was visible at
occipito-parietal (100–150 ms interval, pcluster = 0.030; 150–
200 ms interval, pcluster = 0.005; 200–250 ms interval, pcluster =
0.022) and central (HV: 200–250 ms interval, pcluster = 0.019)
sensors (Figure 4A, top row). A similar effect was also observed
for LV arrows at central sensors only (200–250 ms interval,
pcluster = 0.022) (Figure 4A, middle row), in line with earlier studies
showing subliminal repetition suppression effects [9,33]. Never-
theless, a direct comparison between both conditions shows that
this suppression effect was significantly larger for HV than LV
arrows (HV versus LV: 100–150 ms interval, pcluster = 0.039; 150–
200 ms interval, pcluster = 0.015; 200–250 ms interval, pcluster =
0.05) (Figure 4A, bottom row). Examination of the neural response
to each individual ‘‘change’’ and ‘‘repeat’’ arrows (defined only for
the second to fifth arrow, since the first arrow does not have a
preceding arrow) shows that this effect was robustly found
whenever a new arrow was presented, with no tendency to
decrease with time (Figure S2C). Further, restricting the LV
analysis to the poorest perceivers who scored at chance level in the
six-choice discrimination task (16.7%) showed that this effect was
present equally robustly for these nine ‘‘poor perceivers’’ (see
Figure S3).
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Discussion
In a combination of behavioral and electrophysiological studies,
we showed that while participants are able to accumulate evidence
over time independently from the level of awareness of the
evidence, there were marked differences between accumulation of
low-visibility (LV) and high-visibility (HV) information, both in
terms of brain activity and behavior. Although the amount of
bottom-up information provided by a single HV or LV arrow was
identical, as measured by priming (Figure 1K), the overall
decision-making performance was much less accurate when based
on LV evidence than on HV evidence (Figure 1D). More
interestingly, decision-making speed was modulated by the
amount of accumulated evidence, but only for HV stimuli
(Figure 1E). Also, subjective confidence in decision making was
markedly lower for LV than HV evidence (Figure 1H). Together,
this suggests that while participants could accumulate LV evidence
over time, there are qualitative differences in accumulation of
evidence depending on the level of awareness of the sensory
information.
We observed a strong top-down biasing effect of the amount of
previously accumulated information, only for HV evidence: the
impact of the last arrow stimulus on the final decision decreased
linearly with the amount of previously accumulated evidence
(Figure 1G). Interestingly, participants did not stop accumulating
HV evidence altogether when they had accrued enough
information for their decision: even when a large amount of
evidence (4 units) had already been accrued for one of the two
decisions, the last arrow still had an impact on the decision
process, which was equally large as the impact of any of the LV
stimuli. This suggests that participants did not adopt a fully
‘‘logical’’ or digital counting strategy (perhaps for lack of time, as
arrows come in at a fast pace of one every 300 ms). Rather, on HV
trials only, they attributed a weight to later arrows that was
inversely related to the amount of already accumulated evidence.
These behavioral findings constrain the theoretical modeling of
the task. The observed strategy is not predicted by simple linear
accumulation models [34], since these would predict equal
weighting of later arrows, independently of the amount of
previously accumulated evidence. It is also not in line with a
simple gain of accumulation from LV to HV stimuli, since this
would result in overall larger weights of each arrow, but no
differential modulation by time and prior accumulated evidence.
Rather, the results suggest a more sophisticated mode of evidence
accumulation, in which the update signal is scaled with respect to
the previously accumulated evidence. This behavior arises
naturally from Bayesian and sequential sampling (SPRT) models
[20,21], where evidence is only accumulated up to a bound.
Beyond this bound, further evidence no longer contributes to the
decision, with two consequences: (1) on average, later evidence is
given a smaller weight, especially when early evidence is strong
and the bound is therefore likely to be reached; (2) response time
accelerates in proportion to the likelihood of reaching the bound.
Both of these properties accurately characterize the participants’
behavior on HV trials.
Importantly however, this modulation of evidence accumulation
by prior accumulated evidence was absent for LV stimuli, where
the impact of each arrow was not dependent on temporal position
or prior amount of accumulated evidence. Such a purely linear
accumulation of evidence is exactly what is predicted from optimal
Bayesian integration, assuming that the amount of available
evidence is low and therefore the accumulated amount rarely
reaches threshold (see [20], Figure 2C). This hypothesis can also
explain why RT remained constant on LV trials, independently of
total evidence: even when five arrows point in the same direction,
the total accumulation would still remain below the decision
threshold on most trials, thus always requiring a forced-choice
decision.
Overall, the simplest theoretical model therefore is that LV and
HV trials were processed through a similar accumulation-decision
pathway, yet with LV trials yielding a much lower level of evidence
and therefore remaining far from decision threshold. Conversely,
full awareness of the stimuli may be necessary for their
accumulated evidence to reach a decision threshold which enables
strategic top-down biasing of later evidence accumulation based
on the past accumulation.
Magneto-encephalographic (MEG) recordings lend further
support to this view. They showed that, while initial perceptual
processing was identical for LV and HV evidence, there was a late
divergence between LV and HV, which could be seen ,145 ms
after stimulus onset over occipital cortex (Figure 2). This late
divergence between LV and HV stimuli has been observed earlier
using different masking paradigms [35–37], and these findings are
generally in good accordance with a feedback view of masking, in
which initial processing in visual areas is intact but late
amplification by feedback is disturbed [19,38–40]. Note, however,
that our data do not allow us to make firm claims about the
underlying mechanisms of metacontrast masking, as different
explanations have also been put forward to explain the late sensory
divergence (e.g., [37]). There was also a neural difference between
LV and HV stimuli over left frontal and fronto-central sensors,
which became significant as early as ,55 ms. This early frontal
difference could be seen for all arrows except for the first arrow of
the sequence (Figure S2A). Interestingly, there was a behavioral
counterpart of this effect: whereas the first arrow had equal effects
on the decision for LV and HV arrows, there were large
differences in the weight of the subsequent arrows on the decision
(Figure 1F). This suggests that only after the visibility of the
sequence was established, on the basis of the first arrow, did
participants treat the incoming information differently for LV and
HV arrows. We speculate therefore that this frontal amplification
may be a source of the behaviorally observed biasing effect [41].
While a change in evidence increased activity over parietal and
central areas for both HV and LV evidence (albeit weaker,
Figure 4), a neural influence of accumulated evidence on the
processing of the current arrow was again found only for HV
evidence. This MEG observation corroborates earlier behavioral
and neural results [20] and suggests a neural implementation of
the biasing of later information by past visible information, namely
by a late (,200–300 ms after stimulus onset) top-down modula-
tion of sensory representations (Figure 3).
By manipulating the configuration of the mask only, we created
large differences in stimulus visibility without introducing
differences in stimulus strength [29], as evidenced by equal
priming effects under LV and HV conditions when a single arrow
was presented (Figure 1K). Given that priming was unrelated to
stimulus awareness, it is quite remarkable that the accumulation of
evidence was. What may underlie these differences? Direct
automatic priming effects are probably mediated by fast feedfor-
ward activations, which directly influence the evolving motor
decision program [10]. These feedforward activations are
relatively ‘‘automatic’’ [35] and have been found to be unaffected
by stimulus visibility [14], although they can be modulated by
several top-down factors, such as attention [42,43] and task-set
[44]. In contrast, the slow accumulation of evidence over time, as
probed in the present study, may require self-sustainable recurrent
interactions between distant brain regions, which may only be
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present when participants have complete access to (i.e., full
awareness of) the stimuli [19].
Previous studies have shown that subliminal information
can be accumulated linearly over a few hundreds of milliseconds
[13,14,45–47]. Although indirect consequences of subliminal
information can be measured for several minutes [17] and up to
even as long as 24 h after its presentation [18], these effects may
betray a form of learning and therefore synaptic changes rather
than long-lasting subliminal activation. Indeed, most priming
studies reveal a fast decay of subliminal information within less
than one second [48,49]. Relative to this state of knowledge, the
current study is the first to show that information from sequentially
presented masked stimuli can be accumulated linearly over a long
duration of more than a second. However, we also show a
qualitative difference in how evidence is treated by the nervous
system depending on the level of sensory awareness. As noted
above, this qualitative difference need not imply that the
processing pathway is entirely different for HV compared to LV
trials. Rather, the same decision mechanism may be involved, with
the main difference being that only a trickle of evidence is
accumulated on LV trials, with the consequence that the decision
threshold is typically not reached, therefore preventing the
subsequent deployment of top-down strategies for down-weighting
further incoming arrows. Indeed, our results suggest that the
parietal and prefrontal regions that implement such decision
making by evidence accumulation [1,2] may integrate sensory
evidence across long periods of time, whether or not the original
information was above or below the threshold for conscious access,
but with a much weaker signal in the latter case.
A similar conclusion was reached by Sackur and Dehaene [50]
when studying sequential two-step tasks with subliminal versus
visible digits. As here, a qualitative behavioral difference was seen:
participants were only able to perform a chained task of addition
followed by comparison when the target digits were consciously
seen, although they could perform each individual computation
above chance when the digits were subliminal. This difference,
although qualitative, could have arisen from the fact that
subliminal digits did not yield enough evidence to ever reach
threshold for the first computational step of the chained task.
Thus, as in the present case, the same processing chain could have
been in place on both conscious and non-conscious trials, but with
non-conscious stimuli providing much smaller evidence that did
not allow participants to go past the first processing stage and
deploy further strategies.
There has been ample speculation about the function of
awareness, ranging from none whatsoever [51,52] to enabling
social communication [53]. Our results suggest a potential role of
awareness in biasing information processing, namely the strategic
exploitation of information in line with prior expectations and
goals. This proposal fits with earlier hypotheses which link
conscious access with flexible information processing, owing to
the possibility of quickly circulating the conscious information to
virtually all of the brain’s higher level processors [54–57]. It also
fits with a role of consciousness in enabling ‘‘meta-cognition,’’ the
ability to introspect about self-performance, which also has been
associated with high-level processing in the prefrontal cortex [58].
Here, this strategic biasing process showed clear behavioral and
neural advantages: it sped up processing and reduced neural
computations related to the decision process when enough
evidence had already been accrued. Under conditions of severely
degraded evidence (such as near-threshold or subliminal informa-
tion), the most rational strategy could, however, be to give each
piece of evidence equal weight [20]. Interestingly, the strategic
biasing process for highly visible information may exactly be the
reason why ‘‘conscious’’ decision-making may in some special
cases actually be poorer than ‘‘unconscious’’ decision-making
[59,60], namely when an unbiased (equal) weighting of the
evidence is required.
Materials and Methods
Participants
All participants in all experiments had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. The study was approved by the local institutional
review board (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen), and a written informed
consent was obtained from the participants according to the
Declaration of Helsinki, explicating that they agreed to participate
in the MEG and behavioral experiments.
Stimuli
The experimental stimuli in all experiments were leftward and
rightward pointing arrows. Stimuli were black, presented on a grey
background, and subtended visual angles of 2.0u60.87u (see Figure
S1). Stimuli were presented using a PC running Presentation
software (Neurobehavioral systems, Albany, USA) and shown on a
screen that was ,75 cm away from the participant. Mask stimuli
were constructed such as to either substantially reduce visibility of
the stimuli (metacontrast mask), leading to low-visibility (LV)
stimuli, or have only weak masking properties (pseudo mask),
leading to high-visibility (HV) stimuli. Masks were identical in
terms of overall luminance.
Experiment 1: Decision-Making Task
Sixteen healthy participants (5M/11F, age range 23–35)
participated in the decision-making task (640 trials) within the
MEG environment. Participants were presented with sequences of
five successive arrows, each of which were briefly presented
(17 ms), and followed 50 ms after its onset by a mask (100 ms), and
a blank (150 ms). Therefore, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA)
between successive arrows was 300 ms. Half of the trials contained
metacontrast masks (leading to low-visibility [LV] stimuli) and the
other half pseudo-masks (leading to high-visibility [HV] stimuli;
see Figure 1A). Each arrow sequence contained either all LV or all
HV arrows. At the end of each arrow sequence, the fixation square
turned green, and the participants had to decide as quickly as
possible whether the predominant direction of the arrow stimuli
was left or right, by pressing a button with their left or right hand.
Participants had to respond within a 500 ms time window. Each
trial was followed by a baseline interval, during which a red
fixation square was displayed for an average duration of 2,000 ms
(between 1,750 and 2,250 ms). Several days before the MEG
experiment participants were invited to the lab day to practice the
task (,0.5 h). Prior to MEG data acquisition, participants engaged
in an additional brief training session. During MEG data
acquisition, participants engaged in 10 task blocks, each block
consisting of 64 trials. Total duration of the experiment was
,60 min. For five participants, we collected only eight task blocks,
due to time constraints.
For the analysis of reaction times (RT) and responses, we
discarded trials to which participants responded very early
(RT,150 ms), after the reaction time cut-off (RT.500 ms) or
not at all (missed trials). For the analysis of responses, we
compared the proportion of left/right responses as a function of
the amount of accumulated evidence for a left/right response, for
HV and LV trials (Figure 1D). For reaction times, we compared
the RTs as a function of accumulated evidence for HV and LV
trials (Figure 1E). For the analysis of arrow impact as a function of
time, we used a logistic multiple regression analysis, in order to
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independently estimate the effect of each arrow on the decision
(Figure 1F). For the analysis of arrow influence as a function of
previously accumulated evidence, we quantified the change in
proportion of left/right response as a function of the direction of
the last arrow, for the three levels of previously accumulated
evidence (0, 2, and 4; see Figure 1B and Figure 1G). To investigate
(differences in) linear trends as a function of accumulated evidence
or time, we performed linear regression analysis for each
participant and tested the significance of (differences in) slopes
using (paired samples) t tests.
We recorded ongoing brain activity during Experiment 1 using
a whole-head MEG with 275 axial gradiometers (VSM/CTF
Systems, Port Coquitlam, British Columbia, Canada). Head
localization was monitored continuously during the experiment
using coils that were placed at the cardinal points of the head
(nasion, left and right ear canal). The magnetic fields produced by
these coils were used to measure the position of the participant’s
head with respect to the MEG sensor array. In addition to the
MEG, the electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded from the
supraorbital and infraorbital ridge of the left eye for the
subsequent artifact rejection.
All data analysis was performed using the FieldTrip toolbox
developed at Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and
Behaviour [61] using Matlab 7 (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA).
Data were checked for artifacts using a semiautomatic routine that
helped detecting and rejecting eye blinks, muscle artifacts, and
jumps in the MEG signal caused by the SQUID electronics.
Subsequently, independent component analysis was used to
remove any heart artifacts and eye movements not rejected by
the semiautomatic routine. Finally, we low-pass filtered the data
using a two-pass Butterworth filter (filter order of 6, frequency cut-
off of 40 Hz). We did not apply any high-pass filter. We calculated
an estimate of the planar gradient for the data analysis on the
sensor level. The horizontal and vertical components of the planar
gradients were calculated for each sensor using the signals from the
neighboring sensors, thus approximating the signal measured by
MEG systems with planar gradiometers. The planar field gradient
simplifies the interpretation of the sensor-level data because the
maximal signal typically is located above the source [62]. We
established the significance of the differences in field strength for
each experimental factor at the cluster level, using a nonparamet-
ric cluster randomization test. This test effectively controls the type
I error rate in situations involving multiple comparisons (such as
275 sensors) by clustering neighboring sensor pairs that exhibit the
same effect. The randomization method first identified sensors
whose t statistics exceeded a critical value when comparing two
conditions sensor by sensor (p,0.05, two-sided). In the second
step, to correct for multiple comparisons, contiguous sensors
(separated by ,5 cm) that exceeded the critical value (as defined
in the first step) were considered a cluster. The cluster-level test
statistic was defined from the sum of the t values of the sensors in a
given cluster. The cluster with the maximum sum was used in the
test statistics. The type I error rate for the complete set of 275
sensors was controlled by evaluating the cluster-level test statistic
under the randomization null distribution of the maximum cluster-
level test statistic. This was obtained by randomizing the data
between the two conditions across multiple participants, calculat-
ing t statistics for the new set of clusters. A reference distribution of
cluster-level t statistics was created from 1,000 randomizations.
The p value was estimated according to the proportion of the
randomization null distribution exceeding the observed maximum
cluster-level test statistic (the so-called Monte Carlo p value). MEG
data analysis focused on (1) overall differences between processing
of LV and HV information; (2) neural markers of accumulated
evidence for LV and HV information; and (3) effects of change in
evidence (i.e., repeated versus different arrow direction) for LV
and HV information. In all cases, we performed statistical tests
(corrected for multiple comparisons) at five intervals after the onset
of the arrow stimulus (from 50–300 ms in 50 ms steps). The first
50 ms after the onset of each arrow stimulus were used as a
baseline interval. This ‘‘baseline’’ interval was physiologically
motivated, for it takes approximately 50 ms for a visual stimulus to
reach the cortex [63]. The aim of this baseline procedure was to
effectively remove spill-over of overall activity from the previous
arrow by subtracting out the activity at the onset of the arrow
stimulus. A caveat of this procedure is that the previous LV/HV
arrow may lead to a late (.350 ms) difference in evoked activity,
which is misinterpreted as early differential activity evoked by a
later arrow. Inspection of non-baseline-corrected traces suggests
that this was not the case for our data (see Figure S2A, lower
panel), but this possibility can nevertheless not be conclusively
ruled out. For the analysis of overall differences between LV and
HV arrows, we compared activity during LV and HV arrows,
averaged across all five arrow presentations. For the analysis of
global effects of accumulation evidence, we compared activity for
LV and HV arrows that had ‘‘low prior accumulated evidence’’
and ‘‘high prior accumulated evidence,’’ averaged across the third
to fifth arrow presentation (since there is no differential amount of
prior accumulated evidence until after the first two arrows are
presented). Low evidence consisted of trials with zero (for third and
fifth arrow) or one (for fourth arrow) prior accumulated evidence
at the onset of the arrow. High evidence consisted of trials with
two (for third and fifth arrow), three (for fourth arrow), or four (for
fifth arrow) prior accumulated evidence at the onset of the arrow.
For the analysis of the effect of change in evidence, we compared
activity for LV and HV arrows that were either preceded by the
same arrow (repeat) or preceded by the opposite arrow (change),
averaged across the second to fifth arrow presentation (since there
is no preceding arrow until after the first arrow is presented).
We also sought to establish the first time point of significant
differences between LV and HV stimuli for the three clusters that
showed a significant difference between stimulus types (fronto-
central, parietal, and occipital clusters). We carried out t tests on
5 ms time intervals for the 50–300 ms interval after stimulus onset,
on the difference wave between HV and LV stimuli, for each
cluster. We defined the first time point of significant difference
between HV and LV stimuli as the first sample in which five
contiguous samples (i.e., 25 ms) showed a significant (p,0.05, two-
tailed) difference between conditions.
Experiment 2: Visibility Task
All participants of Experiment 1 also participated in Experiment
2, while still in the MEG environment. To test visibility of strongly
and weakly masked arrows, participants engaged in a six-choice
discrimination task (120 trials, 50% LV and 50% HV). Stimulus
and trial timing was exactly the same as in the experimental task
with the exception that after the presentation of a trial, the
question ‘‘How many arrows were pointing to the left/right?’’ was
presented. This question remained on the screen until the
participant made a response, after which a new trial started.
Participants had to indicate their decision by pressing one of six
response buttons. Whether participants were instructed to detect
right- or left-pointing arrows was counterbalanced across partic-
ipants. Before administering this task, participants were told that
only accuracy was important in this task, not the speed of
responding. To minimize strategic guessing, participants were
notified of the fact that in this task, overall, equal numbers of trials
(10) of each evidence level were presented.
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Experiment 3: Confidence Task
Sixteen participants (5M/11F, age range 20–32), who did not
participate in Experiments 1 and 2, took part in the confidence-
rating task (512 trials). Here, we assessed the relationship between
decision-making performance and subjective confidence. Stimulus
parameters and timing were all identical to Experiment 1, with the
exception of an additional confidence question at the end of each
trial, after the participant had given his/her response. The
following question was presented, 1 s after the participants’
response: ‘‘How confident are you about your response?’’ This
sentence remained on the screen until the participant made a
response, after which a new trial started. Participants had to
indicate the confidence in their decision by pressing one of six
buttons on the keyboard (1 = ‘‘pure guess’’, 6 = ‘‘100% sure’’). The
confidence response was unspeeded.
Experiment 4: Masked Priming Task
All participants of Experiment 3 also participated in Experiment
4. Here we assessed the amount of priming engendered by LV and
HV arrows, using a masked priming experiment (640 trials). Here,
the outline of the mask also formed an arrow stimulus (see Figure
S1). Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible to
the direction of the mask arrow while ignoring the preceding
prime arrow. Stimulus duration was the same as in Experiment 1.
Each trial was followed by a baseline interval with an average
duration of 1,000 ms (between 750 and 1,250 ms).
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Stimuli used in the experiments. Arrow stimulus. The
arrow stimuli subtended a visual angle of 2.0u by 0.87u in all
experiments. For Experiments 1–3, we used rectangular mask
stimuli. Mask stimuli were constructed such as to either have only
weak masking properties (pseudo mask), leading to high-visibility
(HV) stimuli, or substantially reduce visibility of the stimuli
(metacontrast mask), leading to low-visibility (LV) stimuli. Masks
were identical in terms of overall luminance. For the masked
priming task (Experiment 4), the outline of the mask also formed
an arrow stimulus.
(EPS)
Figure S2 Time course of activity (differences) for each arrow.
(A) Time course of overall differences in neural processing of low-
and high-visibility arrow stimuli, for the fronto-central, parietal,
and occipital cluster outlined in Figure 2. Shown are baseline-
corrected traces (top panel) as well as non-baseline-corrected traces
(bottom panel). A direct comparison of these shows that there is a
superposition of activity for each subsequent arrow stimulus as well
as an overall activity increase, which is strongest over frontal
sensors, and somewhat visible over occipital and parietal sensors.
By removing the baseline differences, the signal reflects the
increase in activity generated by the current stimulus, over and
above the activity generated by earlier arrows. (B) Time course of
global effect of accumulated evidence for ‘‘low evidence’’ and
‘‘high evidence’’ arrows, for low- and high-visibility arrow stimuli,
in the clusters outlined in Figure 3. (C) Time course of activity for
‘‘repeat’’ and ‘‘change’’ arrows, for low- and high-visibility arrow
stimuli, in the clusters outlined in Figure 4.
(EPS)
Figure S3 Neural markers of change of evidence for nine ‘‘poor
perceivers’’ who scored at chance level in the six-choice
discrimination task. Topographical representation of larger
activity (between 150 and 250 ms) for arrow stimuli that were
different from their directly preceding arrows (‘‘change’’),
compared to arrow stimuli which were the same direction as
their directly preceding arrows (‘‘repeat’’). This activity difference
was plotted for high-visibility (top row) and low-visibility (middle
row) arrows, as well as the difference in activity between them
(bottom row). Differences are robust and qualitatively similar to
those in the whole group (see Figure 4 for whole group results).
(EPS)
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